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The settlement of the Attorney Generals' suits against the
cigarette industry for $206 billion was a landmark outcome. By
any standard, the financial stakes were enormous, dwarfing even
the largest tort liability judgments and punitive damages awards.
Moreover, what was especially noteworthy was that the party pay-
ing for the costs was the cigarette industry, which to date had
been almost unscathed after decades of litigation involving the
hazards of smoking.
This litigation has also taken place within a context in
which there has been a rising societal interest in the social costs
of smoking. In recent years there has been a flurry of anti-
smoking ordinances and other restrictions. Moreover, the in-
terest in the financial stakes has been prominent, beginning
with the 1994 Clinton health care proposal, which included a
federal tax of $2 per pack on cigarettes. Subsequently, there
was a proposed $368.5 billion settlement fund that would have
resolved the state suits, class action suits, and given the cigarette
industry protection against punitive damages.! Although this
proposed settlement was never adopted by Congress, the actual
resolution of the Attorney Generals' suits involved considerable
costs and had a somewhat more modest scope than the pro-
'John F. Cogan, Jr. Professor of Law and Economics and the Director of the Pro-
gram on Empirical Legal Studies, Harvard Law School, Hauser 302, 1575 Massa-
chusetts Avenue, Cambridge, MA 02138, Phone: (617) 496-0019, Fax: (617) 495-
3010, E-Mail: kip@law.harvard.edu. The author served as an expert on risk
awareness issues for the cigarette industry in the litigation involving the state At-
torney General suits.
I See the "Proposed Resolution" released on June 20, 1997.
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posed federal resolution. Both, however, were similar in that
they included a substantial regulatory component as well as a
cost allocation.
Even more surprising than the enormous amount of the
settlement is that any portion is being paid at all to the states.
Past research at the national level indicates that cigarettes are
self-financing. If cigarettes in effect pay their own way and there
are no net costs, why is it that the states have a valid claim? Is it
possible that the effect of cigarettes on costs borne by the states
may be different than the costs to the country as a whole due to
the different structure of insurance and benefit programs for
the states than the federal government? In this article, I will ex-
amine the nature of the lawsuits and assess the costs the states
incur. This assessment indicates that by any reasonable refer-
ence point, the states on balance benefit financially from ciga-
rettes. Moreover, the method by which the states calculated
costs substantially overstates any legitimate measure of any cost
component, leading to windfall gains to the states as a result of
the cigarette settlement.
These results pertain to the overall net economic implica-
tions. This comprehensive tally may not, however, be what the
courts would have done had the suits been litigated, with the
controversies resolved after appropriate appeals. Cigarettes do
in fact increase expected health care costs. Whether cigarettes
are on balance self-financing consequently depends on which
other cost effects are recognized in determining the economic
loss to the states.
II. THE IMPETUS FOR THE STATE LAWSUITS
A. The Economic Rationale for the Litigation
For market outcomes to be efficient, all costs associated
with the use of the product must be borne by the consumer. If,
for example, consumers impose costs on others that are not re-
flected in the price, they will consume too much of the good.
Similarly, for output by firms to be efficient, production costs
imposed on society must in fact be borne by the producer.
Problems arise in situations in which production and consump-
tion activity impose costs on others, whether it be air pollution
emitted as part of the production process or fatalities resulting
from drunk driving. These adverse consequences affecting oth-
ers, which economists label externalities or external costs, must
be reflected in the costs imposed on the party responsible for
these harms in order to align the incentives with the full social
[29:523
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cost of the actions.
A conventional solution to this difficulty is to impose an
appropriate tax. If, for example, a product imposes 25 cents per
unit cost on others, then a tax of 25 cents per unit, known as a
Pigouvian tax (after the British economist Pigou), will create ef-
ficient incentives for the correct amount of product use. Distri-
butional issues may still arise. The tax may lead the consumers
to generate an efficient amount of harm, but there is also the
task of getting the 25 cent penalty to the party who is harmed.
Such compensation for any loss in welfare is needed to ensure
that the outcome is equitable, but even without such targeting
of the payments, the penalty level itself will be sufficient to lead
to efficient levels of care. For example, a properly set penalty
on heavily polluting vehicles will lead consumers to recognize
the costs of their pollution, which must be offset by some other
valuable car attribute if the product is to remain attractive for
purchase.
The economic underpinnings for the lawsuits filed by the
state attorneys general have a similar impetus. The fundamen-
tal concern is with the financial cost to the states imposed by
smoking behavior. The chief economic cost is that cigarettes
have an adverse effect on individual health, boosting health care
costs and the associated financial burden on the states.
An obvious economic solution to such costs is that the state
could impose an externality tax following the economic text-
book prescription. Unlike externality taxes in general, there is
no problem in directing the payment to the injured party be-
cause it is the state government itself that has suffered the fi-
nancial harm. Thus, the state could tax the product at the time
of sale, rather than suing the cigarette industry after the fact for
these costs.
Taxes have a two-fold advantage over litigation costs. First,
they create incentives at the time of sale for efficient use of the
product. Taxes at the time of use will discourage consumption,
but unanticipated liability costs will not affect product prices. If,
for example, the purpose of these suits is to recoup for net costs
over the previous decades of cigarette consumption, then the
prices consumers paid in the past for cigarettes did not reflect
these costs, and people smoked too much given the costs of
smoking. Appropriate taxes will lead to correct consumption
choices. A second advantage of taxes is that they avoid the con-
siderable litigation costs and attorneys' fees associated with the
state suits. It is noteworthy that both the Proposed Resolution
and the attorneys general case settlement each ultimately had a
tax-like structure for collecting the settlement amount, as will be
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discussed below.
One question raised by this tax-like structure, as well as by
these general concerns about the desirability of taxes, is whether
the sales taxes already imposed by the states do not compensate
the states for any financial costs of cigarettes. As part of the cal-
culation of the costs associated with cigarettes, I will compare
the level of state excise taxes of cigarettes with the financial costs
imposed by cigarettes to see whether from that vantage point
cigarettes are self financing.
B. Profile of the Cigarette Tax
Cigarettes are the most heavily taxed consumer commodity.
Cigarettes have a higher tax rate than alcohol, three times the
tax rate of gasoline, and over ten times the tax rate of utilities
and automobiles.2 For the fiscal year 1998, the total federal,
state, and municipal excise taxes on cigarettes was over $13 bil-
lion.' Of this amount, 24 cents per pack was for the federal ex-
cise tax, yielding a total revenue amount of $5.5 billion.
Cigarette taxes are highly regressive in character. The usual
economic concern with regressivity is whether people in lower
income groups pay a higher proportion of their income for the
tax. Because cigarette consumption decreases as one's income
group rises, the extent of the regressivity is even more extreme.
Indeed, cigarette smokers not only pay a higher tax amount as a
percentage of their income, but also the absolute amount of the
tax paid by the poor is greater than for those in the upper in-
come groups. For example, people with income less than
$10,000 pay five percent of their income in cigarette taxes, while
people who make $50,000 or more pay roughly 0.4 percent of
their income in cigarette taxes.4 The cigarette tax is strikingly
regressive, though there are no apparent racial differences in
terms of the incidence of the cigarette tax.
III. THE NATURE OF THE STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL LAwsurrs
A. The Wrongful Behavior Claims
The trigger for the state lawsuits was that the cigarette in-
dustry engaged in wrongful behavior that led to the financial
costs to the states. These claims were similar for the various
'See Don Fullerton & D.L. Rodgers, Who Bears the Lifetime Burden? 74 (1993).
' See 33 The Tobacco Institute, The Tax Burden on Tobacco, at VII (1998).
'These data are drawn from Table 1 of W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Taxation and the
Social Consequences of Smoking, in 9 TAx POLICY AND THE ECONOMY (James Poterba
ed., 1995).
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states, as well as in the lawsuits filed by the union pension funds,
in their efforts to recoup costs from the cigarette industry.
The wrongful behavior claims fall into three general cate-
gories. Although the character of the lawsuits differed by state,
there were several common themes. First, the states claimed
that the cigarette industry misled, deceived, and confused the
public. In particular, it surpressed its internal research on the
risks and addictive properties of cigarettes, fostering increased
consumption of cigarettes. Second, the states claimed that the
cigarette industry engaged in racketeering activity and was guilty
of public fraud through the Council for Tobacco Research, the
Tobacco Institute, and other efforts. Third, the states claimed
that the industry was guilty of antitrust violations, in particular,
conspiracy to suppress safer cigarettes.
Rather than assess the validity of each of these claims, it is
useful to examine the broader issue of whether there have been
any adverse consequences of this wrongful behavior, assuming
that in fact it took place. Thus, the reference point for the liti-
gation is the following: what would the costs to the states have
been but for the wrongful behavior of the cigarette industry?
This issue can be broken down into two separate questions.
First, are there any net costs of smoking? If there are no net
costs to the states, then there is no financial basis for the claim
and no need to be concerned about the wrongful behavior.
Second, even if there was wrongful behavior, is there any evi-
dence that this wrongful behavior had any effect on consumers
and hence on the costs of smoking? In particular, do consum-
ers underestimate the risks associated with smoking because of
these alleged wrongful acts?
The role of wrongful behavior in affecting costs is critical.
In particular, the cigarette industry is only liable for the particu-
lar share of costs due to its wrongful behavior. Claims by the
states typically fail to make this distinction, as they seek to re-
coup all the costs associated with cigarettes, not break out the
segment due to alleged wrongful conduct. The damages that
can be claimed by the states are limited by time. If the wrongful
conduct started in the early 1950s, it is only the cigarette con-
sumption beginning after that time that can be the basis for the
claim. In addition, the wrongful conduct is limited in amount
to the cost due to the effect of the wrongful behavior on the as-
sessment of risk. After the wrongful conduct began, it is only
the additional costs attributable to the wrongful behavior that
can be recouped. Thus, in terms of Figure 1, suppose that 1950
is the critical date. All the cigarette consumption indicated after
that point would potentially contribute to part of the costs
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claimed by the states. The practical task is trying to assess the
share of costs due to wrongful behavior. One might, however,
seek to establish an upper bound on these costs. Suppose that
whatever wrongful conduct took place was in terms of informa-
tion disclosure. By the current time, all these documents have
now all been released and are public information. Moreover,
there have been decades of research and Surgeon General re-
ports on cigarettes to reduce smoking since the mid-1960s. Pre-
sumably, the rate of smoking in a world without wrongful con-
duct would be no lower than it was in Figure 1 for 1998. Thus,
only that portion of the costs could potentially be claimed by
the states if this approximation to bounding the level of costs is
used.
As part of these suits, the states must show that the wrongful
behavior led to underassessment of risks and that this underas-
sessment led to smoking behavior. If people overassess the
risks, then there is no need to consider this wrongful conduct
further. The next section will document that risk awareness is
quite prevalent for smoking, as one would expect for these
highly publicized risks.
IV. RISK AWARENESS AND PREFERENCES
A. Evidence on Risk Awareness
The principal concern of the state suits is the effect of the
wrongful conduct on underassessment of the risks of smoking.
By almost any standard, cigarette smoking is one of the most
hazardous consumption activities that people undertake on a
large scale. The main empirical issue is the extent to which
people are aware of the magnitude of the risks. If people over-
assess the risks of smoking, then there already is an excessive
market response to smoking hazards.
To explore whether there is overassessment or underas-
sessment of smoking risks, I will utilize data derived from a se-
ries of surveys. The surveys included both national as well as re-
gional surveys. All these surveys were telephone surveys, which
affects the types of questions that can be asked. The 1985 na-
tional survey was administered by Audits and Surveys, Inc. That
survey focused on public perceptions of lung cancer risks. In
1991, 1 generalized the focus of the study using a regional North
Carolina sample for which I analyzed perceptions of the effects
of smoking on lung cancer mortality, total mortality, and life
expectancy loss. This survey framework in turn provided the ba-
sis for a 1997 survey, which was also run nationally by Audit and
[29:523
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Surveys, Inc. Finally, to access whether the Medicaid population
was aware of smoking risks, a 1998 survey in Massachusetts ad-
ministered by Roper and Starch Worldwide considered that
class of issues for a sample that included disproportionate rep-
resentation of the Medicaid population. With the exception of
my 1991 North Carolina survey, all these surveys were funded by
law firms representing the cigarette industry, but none of the
respondents were aware of the source of the funding.5
Before considering the results of the surveys, it is useful to
establish a reference point for what the true risk levels are for
these various outcomes. I will use risk estimates based on stud-
ies by the U.S. Surgeon General, which I will take at face value.
One can question some of the underlying assumptions in the
statistical studies reported by the Surgeon General, such as
whether adequate controls were included for other risky behav-
iors. However, these estimates are useful as a plausible upper
bound on the risks and, more importantly, they are the most
widely recognized estimates in this area. If people's risk percep-
tions are at least as high as would be suggested by the Surgeon
General's studies, then we can be confident that there is no
problem of risk underassessment. Smoking decisions could, of
course, be flawed for other reasons, but lack of awareness of the
hazards can be ruled out as a factor.
The specific estimates that I use are based on the Surgeon
General's estimates of the total number of adverse health out-
comes, such as smoking-related fatalities. I have coupled this in-
formation with estimates of the size of the smoking population
to determine a risk level measured in terms of a probability of
an adverse health consequence.6 In 1985, the overall additional
lung cancer mortality risk due to smoking was .05-.10. By 1991,
studies indicated that this risk was somewhat higher, around .06-
.13. The total incremental mortality risk to the smoker in 1991
and thereafter is from .18-.36. Finally, the estimated life expec-
tancy loss, which represents the combined influence of the
probability of premature death coupled with the length of life
lost in the event of a death, is from 3.6-7.2 years.
Table 1 reports the estimates of the smoking risk percep-
tions for a variety of different health outcomes. The lung can-
cer question was framed in terms of the number out of how
many smokers who would either get lung cancer because they
smoke or die from lung cancer because they smoke. For both
' The texts of the 1985 and 1991 surveys appear in W. KIP VISCUSI, SMOKING:
MAKING THE RISKYDECISION (1992).
' For these estimates and the procedures for calculating them, see id. at 69-78.
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the full sample as well as for the current smoking population,
the estimates of the lung cancer risk are several times greater
than the actual estimated risk of lung cancer associated with
smoking. For the smoking population, the estimated lung can-
cer risk perception levels ranged from 0.31 to 0.42. There ap-
pears to be some modest upward drift over time in the level of
lung cancer risk perceptions. The wording of the question in
terms of lung cancer incidence or lung cancer mortality risks
does not appear to be of major consequence. It should be
noted that the sample composition varies across the surveys, and
these differences alone may contribute to the minor variations
in the lung cancer responses.
Because lung cancer has been the most highly publicized
hazard of smoking, beginning with the landmark 1964 report by
the Surgeon General, one might hypothesize that the public's
overestimation of risk was restricted to this particular health
outcome. Analysis of the total mortality risk perception estimate
indicates, however, that although the risk overestimation is
greatest for lung cancer, the perceived risk is greater than the
upper bound scientific estimate of the risk level for both smok-
ers as well as for the general population. In particular, for all
three surveys smokers believe that there is at least a 42% chance
that they will die from lung cancer, heart disease, throat cancer,
or some other illness because they smoke. As in the case of the
lung cancer questions, the framing of the question is in terms of
the risk to a group of 100 people, which is a denominator that
respondents find easy to conceptualize.
The final set of estimates in Table 1 pertains to the per-
ceived life expectancy loss. This question was posed in two dif-
ferent ways. First, the North Carolina survey told respondents
their remaining life expectancy at age 21 and asked what the
remaining life expectancy would be for an average smoker. The
1997 national survey told people the actual life expectancy at
age 21 and asked respondents what the perceived actual life ex-
pectancy would be for smokers. In each case, respondents as-
sess a substantial life expectancy loss, where the average for the
male and female smokers exceeds the upper bound estimate for
the actual life expectancy loss associated with smoking.
The evidence for the Massachusetts survey on lung cancer
mortality, total mortality, and life expectancy loss, yielded simi-
lar results, but for more focused populations. These results are
of particular pertinence to the litigation because that sample fo-
cused on the Medicaid population, which was the subject of the
state attorney general suits. This sample exhibited a similar pat-
tern of overestimation of the risk. Moreover, the sample of un-
[29:523
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ion workers in the Massachusetts respondent group had re-
sponses similar to those of the nonunion workers, which is a re-
sult pertinent to the lawsuits filed by union pension funds. For
these suits risk awareness among union members has been a key
issue.
Even if one accepted the result that smokers believe that
there is a risk of smoking to others, one might hypothesize that
they do not really believe that there is a risk to themselves. One
might hypothesize that perhaps they suffer from optimism bias
and do not internalize the risk. Even if this is true, it is unclear
whether the cigarette industry should be held responsible for
this form if individual rationality. Awareness of the risk is the
usual province of hazard warnings cases rather than cognitive
failings of the individual.
More fundamentally, optimism bias may be an illusion
based on survey framing. Surveys that ask people whether they
are above average or below average in riskiness invariably find
that people believe that they are better than average.7 Most of
us, for example, like to think that we are above average drivers.
However, these same surveys that indicate that people are above
average in safety also show that their risk decisions in that do-
main are excessively cautious. Whereas parents believe that
their households are above average in terms of child safety risks,
when confronted with opportunities to buy safer products for
their children, they often give excessive risk values rather than
the inadequate amounts that would be hypothesized if optimism
biases were influential.'
To judge whether smoking risk beliefs reflect an actual rec-
ognition of the hazards, the most meaningful test is to deter-
mine whether people in fact respond to these beliefs when mak-
ing their smoking decisions. The empirical evidence suggests
that higher risk perceptions do in fact reduce smoking rates.
One way to get an assessment of the extent of these influences is
to ask what smoking rates would be if people were unaware of
the risk.' If, for example, lung cancer risk perceptions were
zero, smoking rates would rise by 7.5 percent-or roughly a one-
quarter increase in the size of the entire smoking population.
If smokers underestimated the risk, then one could deter
smoking behavior by imposing an excise tax on cigarettes.
Thus, one can view excise taxes as in effect endowing smokers
See W. Kip Viscusi & Wesley A. Magat, Learning About Risk: Consumer and
Worker Responses to Hazard Information (1987).
' See id.
'These estimates are drawn from Viscusi, supra note 5, at 99-109.
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with the equivalent of an awareness of smoking risks, even in
situations in which there is no such risk belief. Calculations for
each of the 50 states indicates that excise taxes discourage smok-
ing to the same extent as with lung cancer risk perceptions
ranging from 0.17-0.38, where this effect depends on how re-
sponsive cigarette demand would be to changes in the price or
tax level.V 0
Another useful index of risk awareness is the extent to
which cigarette smoking behavior is reflective of the kinds of
decisions smokers make in other contexts. If smoking behavior
is due to a difference in individual preferences, then one would
expect smokers also to be willing to engage in other risky behav-
iors if they have a greater willingness to incur health hazards. A
difference in the taste for tobacco could, of course, be an addi-
tional factor that leads some people to find smoking more at-
tractive.
The empirical evidence indicates that smokers are in fact
quite different from nonsmokers in a variety of respects.1" In
particular, smokers are more willing to work in hazardous jobs.
They choose jobs in higher risk industries, and they require less
money in compensation for these higher risks than do non-
smokers. Moreover, controlling for the riskiness for the type of
job, smokers are more likely to be injured. Smokers are also
more likely to be injured in home accidents than are nonsmok-
ers. Similar behaviors are reflected in other risk preventive
measures, as smokers are less likely to check their blood pres-
sure regularly, and they floss their teeth less often. All available
evidence suggests that smokers differ from nonsmokers not only
in their smoking behavior, but also in their risk taking behavior
across a wide variety of decision contexts.
V. INSURANCE EXTERNALITIES OF SMOKING
Because cigarettes increase the health costs of smokers,
there is a popular view that cigarette smokers must be more
costly to society than nonsmokers. This health cost linkage is
the foundation of the state lawsuits. In particular, to what ex-
tent are people other than smokers footing the bill for smoking
related costs? The portion of these costs borne by the states is
the specific focus of the state suits. To assess the level of smok-
10 See id.
These results are drawn from Joni Hersch and W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Smoking,
Seatbelt Use, and Differences in Wage-Risk Tradeoffs, 25 J. HUM. RESOURCES 202 (1990);
Joni Hersch and W. Kip Viscusi, Smoking and Other Risky Behaviors, 28 J. DRUG
ISSUES 645 (1998); and W. Kip Viscusi and Joni Hersch, Cigarette Smokers as Job Risk
Takers, Harvard Law School Working Paper (1999).
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ing related costs, one must ask what would the costs have been
but for the smoking behavior. In effect, one must look at the
trajectory of costs over time, taking into account both the dif-
ference in the costs in each year, as well as possible differences
in life expectancy that affect how long these costs are generated.
Because these costs occur over time, it is the present value of
these costs that is the appropriate damages measure, as is rou-
tine for damages calculations. Thus, when undertaking the cost
analysis, one must examine these costs on a lifetime basis, not
simply look at relative cost differences for a particular year of
medical costs. To determine net costs, one must take into ac-
count all insurance consequences, not simply select those which
are associated with increases in costs due to smoking.
The economics literature includes a variety of previous as-
sessments of the costs associated with smoking.'" My analysis is
in the spirit of these estimates in which I have adjusted for
changes in medical care utilization and prices that have taken
place over time. These estimates have also been prepared both
adjusting for tar levels in cigarettes and not including such ad-
justments. The tar level, which is the most commonly used
composite measure of chemical residues linked to cancer, has
declined. If there is a linear dose-response relationship between
the tar level and the cigarette risk, then the health costs would
also presumably be proportionate to the tar level. As it turns
out, making an adjustment for the tar level of cigarettes actually
increases the net social costs of smoking because the cost savings
associated with premature mortality are reduced.' 3 The esti-
mates presented here will be for a nonsmoking smoker, which is
to say a representative person in the nonsmoking population
who has the demographic characteristics of a smoker.' Thus,
to the extent that people are more likely to be incurring high
health expenses because they are less well-educated or live in
particularly high health cost regions, such influences would be
taken into account and not attributed to smoking behavior.
Table 2 summarizes the social costs of smoking on a na-
tional basis, including costs to the federal government, state
2 See W.G. MANNING ET AL., THE COSTS OF POOR HEALTH HABITS (1991); J.B.
SHOVEN ET AL., The Social Security Costs of Smoking, in THE ECONOMICS OF AGING
(D.A. Wise ed., 1987); Jane Gravelle and Dennis Zimmerman, Cigarette Taxes to
Fund Health Care Reform: An Economic Analysis, Congressional Research Report
(1994); Viscusi, supra note 4.
" Adjustment for the level of tar in cigarettes is also controversial to the extent
that smokers of lower tar cigarettes inhale more deeply than they would in smok-
ing conventional cigarettes.
" In particular, the baseline for these estimates was developed using the nonsmok-
ing smoker analysis of MANNING, supra note 12.
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governments, and private insurers. Because these costs are on a
lifetime basis, they must be brought back to present value. The
estimates shown on this table use a rate of interest of three per-
cent when converting future costs into their present value cost
equivalents. Because the estimates are fairly similar both with-
out a tar adjustment and after adjusting for tar content, let us
focus primarily on the estimates in which there is no adjustment
for the tar content of cigarettes. Overall, cigarette smokers im-
pose additional medical care costs of 58 cents per pack. This is
a net cost increase that fully recognizes the fact that because of
their premature mortality, smokers will not be generating addi-
tional medical costs after their death.
Focusing on medical costs alone does not, however, tell the
whole story. There are other cost components that rise as well.
Smokers incur additional sick leave costs of a penny a pack, ad-
ditional life insurance costs of 14 cents per pack, additional
property damage costs due to smoking-related fires of two cents
per pack, and additional costs because they do not pay payroll
taxes on earnings after their death of 42 cents per pack. There
are also two major categories of cost savings. Because of smok-
ers' premature mortality they generate lower nursing home care
costs, leading to a cost savings of 24 cents per pack, and by fail-
ing to live to the full life expectancy, there is a retirement and
pension cost savings of $1.26 per pack. On balance, the net cost
savings is 32 cents per pack without a tar adjustment and 29
cents per pack after making a tar adjustment. This cost savings
of 32 cents per pack is in addition to the 56 cents per pack sav-
ings in excise taxes at the time of these calculations.
Are these cost savings components a legitimate concern or
some kind of bizarre death credit? These calculations in no way
ensure that premature death of smokers is a desirable outcome.
Any concern regarding wrongful deaths of smokers should be
the province of individual tort suits, not the state suits which
were only concerned with financial losses to the state, not health
effects on individuals. The estimates in Table 2 are directed
solely at the financial losses imposed on society and address the
fundamental issue of what the economic effects would be but
for the smoking behavior. If there had been any net losses, the
next question to resolve would be what is the share of these
losses attributable to the wrongful behavior?
The cost savings for the country as a whole do not necessar-
ily carry over to the particular states. The major area of national
cost savings is for social security benefits, and to the extent that
pension-related benefits for state employees do not loom as
large in the state budgets as do the federal social security pro-
[29:523
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gram payments, there will be fewer cost offsets included in the
calculations. After generating the state-specific numbers, one
finds however that the states profit from cigarettes from an in-
surance standpoint as well.
Table 3 summarizes the results for five states and the na-
tional average. These states include Alabama, two states that
were prominent in the cigarette litigation (Florida and Missis-
sippi), and the two largest states (California and New York).
The results are fairly similar across states, so let us focus on the
results from Alabama, a state that resisted launching a suit
against the tobacco industry. The medical care costs of concern
include the state's share of costs of the Medicaid program, as
well as the state's portion of all other medical costs, such as hos-
pital expenses, that are affected by smoking behavior. Overall,
medical care costs to the state are two cents per pack in Ala-
bama. However, if we also take into account the nursing home
cost savings, which involves a reduced cost of four cents per
pack, we find that looking at the medical care and nursing
home care component combined that there is a net savings of
cost due to smoking and the shortened associated life spans.
Similarly, the pension cost savings of six cents per pack is
roughly triple the medical cost increase. The total insurance ex-
ternalities due to smoking involve a six cents per pack savings in
Alabama. These total cost estimates include the components
shown in Table 3, as well as other small entries such as sick leave
and life insurance. Moreover, this cost savings does not even in-
clude the additional payments made to the state through excise
taxes of 16 '/ cents per pack in Alabama. Similar results pertain
to the other states in Table 3. Thus, the only way in which ciga-
rettes can be viewed as increasing the costs to the states is by
framing the cost issue in terms of the medical care component
alone.
VI. How THE STATES CALCULATE COSTS
Not surprisingly, the state lawsuits were quite focused in
that they concentrated only on the medical care consequences.
Thus, the effort was not to assess the total net external cost to
the states, but rather to isolate the main cost component that
increased as a result of smoking behavior. Much of the battle in
the various jurisdictions involved whether other cost conse-
quences, such as nursing home and pension savings, could be
included. Another salient issue was whether excise taxes could
be viewed as an offset for the medical care cost increase.
My calculation of the national cost of cigarettes shown in
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Table 2 represents a straightforward accounting of the cost con-
sequences of cigarettes, which leads to results that are consistent
with all published economic studies of these effects. Neverthe-
less, in the memorandum filed by the state of Mississippi on the
tobacco litigation, the state of Mississippi described my analysis,
which at the time was included in a National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research working paper, as "ghoulish," "cold-blooded,"
"depraved," "base," "evil," "corrupt," "repugnant," "offensive to
human decency," and "robbing the graves of smokers." How-
ever, the analysis itself was in no way normative in character. It
was not undertaken to show that these smoking-related deaths
were a good outcome. Rather, the intent was simply to calculate
what the financial cost implications of smoking are if one does
this exercise in a comprehensive manner.
One might well suggest that these calculations ignore what
many believe are the central concerns. On the negative side,
what about the loss to smokers and their families from their ill
health and premature death? On the positive side, presumably
there is some benefit smokers derive from smoking since they
continue to purchase this costly product even in the wake of
decades of health warnings and public information campaigns.
Recognition of these private valuations and private health costs
would be part of a broader societal analysis of the benefits of
smoking and whether particular kinds of smoking restrictions
might be appropriate. However, these broader and more fun-
damental questions were not the focus of the state lawsuits.
These lawsuits had nothing whatsoever to do with individual
health, but were focused exclusively on the higher Medicaid cost
to the states. Thus, the task was little more than a comprehen-
sive accounting exercise rather than a more broadly based socie-
tal assessment of the direction cigarette policy should take.
In many respects, these state suits are not even the appro-
priate mechanism for addressing such harms. If there are losses
to the individual smoker, then they can file private tort suits in
attempt to recoup their damages. Although most of these suits
have been unsuccessful, in 1999 there were two successful plain-
tiff verdicts in San Francisco and Oregon, and each led to a sub-
stantial award amount.
Even though the focus was solely on the increased medical
costs, the nature of the calculations nevertheless involved sub-
stantial controversy in terms of the approaches used by plaintiffs
and defendants. Medicaid costs are shared by the state and fed-
eral governments, where this share depends on the income level
in the state. Even though in states such as Mississippi the fed-
eral share accounts for over two-thirds of the Medicaid costs, the
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state's claims sought compensation for the federal costs as well
as the state share of Medicaid. Thus, in effect, the state would
get paid twice for this component. Given that the states at-
tempted to recoup both the federal and state shares, attempts
by U.S. budget officials to assert a claim to part of the settlement
on behalf of the federal government were not entirely mis-
placed.
A second way in which the states attempted to boost their
take was by claiming reimbursement of costs that would have
been incurred by smokers had they lived and not died prema-
turely due to smoking. Thus, the states labeled attempts to rec-
ognize the shorter life expectancy of smokers as a "death
credit," whereas in fact such recognition is simply proper ac-
counting for the actual costs that will be generated by smokers
given their shortened life expectancy caused by their smoking
behavior. By failing to recognize differences in life expectancy,
the state cost calculations in effect charged cigarette companies
for costs after smokers are dead, based on their relative costs
while alive. However, smokers have these relative costs because
they are sicker and die sooner, incurring all of the costs associ-
ated with death. The states consequently sought to recoup costs
that smokers never generated, as well as costs that were already
paid for through the federal government's Medicaid share. The
state calculations also sought to collect for all smoking-
attributable costs without isolating the portion due to wrongful
behavior. By any measure, these suits represented a potential
profit center for the states.
What restrictions are there, in terms of counting cost com-
ponents, to prevent plaintiffs from gaining the system even fur-
ther once net costs are not a matter of concern? Suppose that
Medicaid has two parts-Part A and Part B. If smoking in-
creases Part A costs and decreases Part B costs, can the states fo-
cus only on the Part A costs and ignore the cost savings? More
generally, can the states go disease by disease and only claim the
cost components that are higher and ignore those that are
lower? This concern is not merely hypothetical because getting
lung cancer in one's 60s will decrease the chance that one gets
Alzheimer's disease in one's 80s. The underlying fallacy of all
such manipulations is that they fail to address the basic issue of
what the economic harm to the states has been, which by its very
nature is a net cost increase concept.
VII. THE RESOLUTION OF THE STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL Surrs
Because of the substantial litigation costs and legal uncer-
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tainties associated with litigating these suits in a variety of state
jurisdictions, the cigarette industry sought a negotiated settle-
ment of this litigation in 1997. The proposed resolution of the
tobacco litigation would have provided for $368.5 billion in
payments over 25 years, substantial regulatory changes, and
shielding of the companies from litigation by the states, class ac-
tions, and punitive damages claims. To take effect, this resolu-
tion needed to be passed by Congress, which it failed to do.
Much of the difficulty arose as the original proposal, which was
tantamount to a 62 cent per pack tax, spun out of control as an-
tismoking congressmen such as Senator Ted Kennedy proposed
taxes of $1.50 per pack, leading the industry to drop its support
for the agreement.
At the end of 1998, the industry did reach a separate set-
tlement agreement with the group of 46 attorneys general who
had not yet settled. It had already settled with four states in
separate agreements, as Mississippi received $3.5 billion, Florida
received $11.3 billion, Texas received $15.3 billion, and Minne-
sota received $6.6 billion. Thus, these $36.5 billion in settle-
ments are not included in the overall price tag of $206 billion,
which was the most highly publicized figure from the master set-
tlement agreement.
The master state settlement included substantial reforms.
Whereas ideally one might want these reforms to emerge from a
national policy discussion and federal legislation, these reforms
are the results of the decentralized bargains by the state attor-
neys general. The regulations included a prohibition of target-
ing youths in cigarette marketing, a ban on the use of cartoons
(e.g., Joe Camel, who had already been retired by R.J. Rey-
nolds), limitations on corporate sponsorships of events, elimina-
tion of outdoor advertising and advertisements, no payments for
product placements, a ban on tobacco brand name merchan-
dise, ban on youth access to free samples, and lobbying limits.
In particular, the industry had to dissolve the Tobacco Institute
and the Council for Tobacco Research-U.S.A. as well as the
Center for Indoor Air Research, but it had the freedom to form
new trade associations so that the net effect of this lobbying
limit is unclear.
15
The effect of the advertising limit on broader social objec-
tives is unclear. If the primary effect of advertising is to affect
" It should also be noted that the Tobacco Institute served a general educational
role as well by, for example, issuing its annual volume on the Tax Burden on To-
bacco, which consists of over 200 pages of detailed data on cigarette sales, taxes,
and prices. This report has served as a resource for numerous economic studies
of the tobacco industry, including the cost estimates presented above.
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brand choice, then banning advertising or restricting it in im-
portant domains has the effect of locking in the current market
shares to the extent that firms cannot advertise new brands.
Firms with a high market share at the present time, notably Phil-
lip Morris, will presumably tend to benefit more than firms with
a more modest market share. New market introductions by
these firms will be more difficult so that it will be harder to get
smokers to switch brands or to switch to different types of ciga-
rettes by making consumers aware of the properties of these
new products. This disadvantage is potentially troublesome,
both from the standpoint of fostering competitive markets in
terms of pricing, but also from the standpoint of enabling firms
to have an avenue to provide information to consumers about
safer cigarettes that are developed in the future.
The original participating manufacturers in the settlement
included the four major producers: Phillip Morris Incorpo-
rated, RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Brown and Williams
Tobacco Company, and Lorillard Tobacco Company. As a re-
sult of the settlement, these firms were released of all claims re-
lating to the state suits. In particular, they were released of all
claims for past conduct targeted in the state suits, where these
claims were based on sale, research, and statements regarding
tobacco products. Similarly, the firms were released of state suit
claims for future conduct, and monetary claims relating to to-
bacco product exposure.
The functioning of the payments to be made under the
agreement is very much akin to that of a tax per pack. Costs are
to be based on the firm's market share, based on the total num-
ber of individuals sold. If, for example, the tax level were $8 bil-
lion annually, there would be a 33 cent per pack tax-equivalent
charge associated with the agreement. The actual increase in
the price per pack will be more due to the costs generated by at-
torney's fees, the cost of the agreements with the four states with
separate settlements, wholesaler markup, and related expenses.
The focal point of the public discussion has been on the
publicized figure of $206 billion for the master settlement
agreement, rather than on the per pack equivalent. The actual
cost levels are much more complex than a simple flat payment
level, however. The scope of the settlement with the states was
quite complex and involved more than cash transfers. The fi-
nancial outlays also were targeted for specific purposes related
to anti-smoking efforts.
First, the cigarette industry would be funding a foundation
to reduce youth smoking. The base payments would be $25 mil-
lion in 1999 and in the subsequent nine years for a ten year total
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of $250 million.
Second, the cigarette industry would also fund a national
public education fund that would be more broadly based. The
amount of funds going to this effort would be $250 million in
1999, and $300 million beginning in the year 2000 and continu-
ing for every year through 2003, for a total amount of $1.45 bil-
lion. Whereas there would be no inflation adjustments for the
youth smoking payments, the national public education fund
payments would be subject both to an inflation adjustment and
to a volume adjustment based on the level of cigarette sales by
the particular firm.
The third component of financial payments is for enforce-
ment efforts related to the settlement agreement. In particular,
the firms must contribute $150,000 annually to fund an execu-
tive committee to supervise the agreement, or $1.5 million over
10 years. Moreover, the firms must pay $50 million in 1999 for
enforcement of the agreement. These payments are subject to
both inflation adjustments as well as volume adjustments.
Table 4 summarizes the payments the firms must make for
the settlement agreement, which go above and beyond their
payments for the various educational efforts mentioned earlier.
The first column of payments lists the initial payment amounts
for the years 1999-2003. These initial payments range from $2.4
billion to $2.7 billion. The next column of payments pertains to
annual payments, and these begin at $4.5 billion in the year
2000 and rise to $9 billion in the years 2018 into perpetuity.
Note that whereas the press has focused on payments over the
initial 25 years, these annual payments do not stop in 2023 but
continue forever. The final set of payments, which are desig-
nated additional payments, are for $0.861 billion from the years
2008 through 2017. These payments are distinguished in dif-
ferent categories in part because different kinds of volume and
inflation adjustments pertain to them. The final column in Ta-
ble 4 lists the total payment amounts, which begin at $2.4 billion
in 1999 and rise to a total of $9 billion by 2008 and remain at
that level in perpetuity.
Table 4 also lists the 25 year payment totals for each col-
umn of costs. These amounts are $12.7 billion for the initial
payments, $190 billion for the annual payments, and $9 billion
for the additional payments, for a total amount of $211.7 bil-
lion.
In terms of the total costs over the 25 year period, one must
also add in the base payments to the foundation of $0.25 billion
and the additional payments of $1.45 billion. There are also the
executive committee payments of $0.004 billion and enforce-
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ment payments of $0.05 billion. The net result is that the total
payment over 25 years come to $213 billion, as is summarized in
Table 5.
Payments made in the future have a smaller economic value
than payments made today. Even though most cost compo-
nents are indexed for inflation, current payments can be in-
vested and are consequently more valuable than future pay-
ments. Using a 3 percent real (i.e., net of inflation) rate of
interest, the present value of the losses over 25 years is $150 bil-
lion.
The agreement also specified the share of the settlement
fund that would be received by each state. These state alloca-
tions were a political outcome that resulted from the negotia-
tions among the attorneys general. Table 6 lists the state alloca-
tion percentages for several of the states participating in the
agreement. It is noteworthy that the two largest states, Califor-
nia and New York, each received 12.76 percent. Such equality is
not coincidental, but is in fact a reflection of the political nature
of the agreement to allocate the settlement fund.
An interesting question to ask is whether the state did bet-
ter than its proportional share of the total medical costs. The
first component of this assessment is to determine the level of
medical costs in each state. This can be done by multiplying the
medical cost estimate for the state, which is in terms of a cost
per pack, by the total number of packs of cigarettes sold in the
state. After determining this amount for each state, one can as-
certain the total medical costs to the states throughout the
country. Using this value for total costs and the counterpart
value for each state's specific costs, one can readily calculate the
proportionate share of the medical costs. By dividing the pro-
portionate share of the medical costs by the share of the settle-
ment agreement received by the state, one can determine
whether a state beat the average or performed worse than the
average. Thus, if the ratio of the percentage share of the
agreement to the percentage share of the medical costs is 1.0,
then the state exactly breaks even with respect to how it should
have done in terms of the settlement outcome. For the state of
Alabama, the allocation percentage was 1.6 percent and the
medical cost share was 1.5 percent. By dividing the allocation
amount by the medical cost share, one finds that Alabama was
paid $1.08 by this agreement for every dollar that it incurred in
terms of its share of the medical costs. Thus, the state of Ala-
bama beat the average performance of other states in terms of
reaping its portion of the settlement payments. This outcome is
especially noteworthy because Alabama was a holdout in terms
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of taking initiative against the cigarette industry. Alabama At-
torney General William Pryor consequently was able to reap a
disproportionate share of the settlement amount as part of the
agreement among the attorneys general without having to incur
the litigation costs associated with filing a claim against the to-
bacco industry.
The state of Mississippi is shown in Table 6 as receiving zero
percentage. Other states that settled separately with the tobacco
industry also received no share of this settlement so that this en-
try is simply a reminder of the limited scope of the settlement
agreement that pertains to the 46 states that did not reach sepa-
rate agreements.
In a typical court award to a plaintiff in a personal injury
case, a portion of the award amount is used to pay the attorneys'
fees. However, in this case the attorneys' fees will be borne by
the companies rather than by the states so that the settlement
amount reflects the net take by the states including the attorney
fee costs. From a bargaining standpoint one would of course
expect that the amount of the settlement given to the states
would be less if the cigarette industry would also have to be pay-
ing the attorneys' fees of the states. Thus, by putting the attor-
neys' fees under a separate heading, it simply establishes a sepa-
rate category of costs which the firms must ultimately bear.
Whether these costs are included as part of the package or
treated as a separate component will be equivalent from the
standpoint of the firm. Nevertheless, making attorneys' fees not
a part of the settlement is likely to make the settlement more
politically acceptable to the constituents in these states. The
process of determining these fees has been relatively hidden as
well. The general public might be upset to see lawyers receiving
billions of dollars in compensation so that the political salability
of the agreement can be enhanced by making attorneys' fees
appear to be a distinct and less visible component.
The agreement provides for the companies to pay for the
fees of attorneys and paralegals and to compensate them "for
time reasonably expended" for the government entities. Simi-
larly, they must pay private outside counsel "reasonable attor-
ney's fees." These amounts have a quarterly payment cap of
$125 million, or $500 million annually, but this amount is into
perpetuity.
The attorneys' fee outcome was the result of a decision by
an arbitration panel. That group awarded lawyers for the cases
in Florida, Mississippi, and Texas attorneys' fees of $8.1 billion.
Media experts pegged the estimated total attorneys' fees to be
awarded for all states to be in the $20 billion range for under
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500 lawyers. How high the actual payments will be and whether
the payments will in fact be greater than this amount remains
uncertain.
VIII. FUTURE PROSPECTS
The implications of the state suits for the federal govern-
ment were not lost on President Clinton. In his 1999 State of
the Union address, he announced plans to pursue a 55 cents
per pack cigarette tax. Moreover, in a late addition to that ad-
dress (after the text had been released to the press), he also in-
dicated that he planned a federal suit against the industry that
would parallel those by the states. Although the legal under-
pinnings for the suit have not yet been made clear, if the suit
does have standing, the costs potentially would be very high.
The bulk of the funding of Medicaid is from the federal gov-
ernment rather that from the states, which were able to collect
hundreds of billions of dollars for their losses. The stakes for
the federal suit have yet to be specified, as they potentially'could
include Medicare as well as the major share of Medicaid.
Moreover, it is not yet clear whether the cigarette industry
would challenge such a suit in court rather than choosing to set-
tle the case.
One outgrowth of the states' suits is that federal budget of-
ficials initially suggested that a certain percentage of the state
settlement be earmarked for the federal government because of
its contributions to Medicaid. This proposal was in fact consis-
tent with the way in which the states calculated losses for their
lawsuits, as they included the federal share. However, the states
successfully resisted this attempt to divert funds from the states
to the federal government.
The settlement of the state suits for more than $200 billion
established a new reference point and potential anchor for run-
away juries. As part of the settlement there was a broad release
of the documents used in the litigation, which were placed on
the web and received substantial publicity. The flurry of anti-
smoking efforts funded in part by the settlement and the expec-
tation of multi-billion dollar awards have not only spurred the
federal government into action, but have also led to suits being
filed by union pension funds, as well as more private lawsuits.
Shortly after the settlement, for example, there was a successful
San Francisco lawsuit in which an individual plaintiff suffering
from diseases that were claimed to be smoking-related received
a $50 million award, which was triple the punitive damages
award that was requested by the plaintiff's attorney. Indeed,
HeinOnline  -- 29 Cumb. L. Rev. 543 1998-1999
CUMBERLAND LA W REVIEW
one juror interviewed after the verdict indicated that she fa-
vored a $1 billion sanction. One potential ramification of the
settlement is that now juries are beginning to think in terms of
billions rather than millions as a realistic dollar figure for a tort
liability outcome. If awards of $50 million per person who suf-
fered premature mortality from cigarettes are multiplied by the
more than 400,000 annual smoking related deaths estimated by
the Surgeon General, then the stakes could become quite high
indeed.
In terms of the future prognosis for the tobacco industry, it
is clear that the industry did not buy peace with this settlement,
but in fact may have stimulated further litigation. Moreover, no
legal issues were ultimately involved so that the precedent for
other industries is unclear. Which suits have standing? Is the
tobacco industry experience in any way unique, or can it be
readily transferred to other industries? The subsequent suits
filed against the gun industry by several municipalities suggest
that this phenomenon may be more widespread than being
simply a tobacco related issue. Alcoholic beverages, cars, and
lead paint similarly could emerge as targets for litigation.
Because these issues were not resolved through the judicial
process, there is also no resolution on how costs should be
counted for such lawsuits. Is the concern with net costs or gross
costs of a particular cost component? For example, is it appro-
priate to net out the nursing home cost savings and pension
cost savings, or should one simply look at the increase in medi-
cal costs? Similarly, do excise taxes matter as a concern? Given
that the settlement agreement is tantamount to imposing a
higher tax rate on cigarettes, the question arises as to whether
other excise taxes paid by smokers as a result of state tax levies
also should be counted.
Most fundamentally, why is it that these matters are the
province of the courts rather than the legislative process? The
hazards of cigarettes are known. It is possible to tax and regu-
late cigarettes now rather that relying on retrospective lawsuits
to address the issue. Moreover, this regulation can emerge from
a consensus process in which legislators formulate regulatory
objectives and policies that represent the national interest. In
contrast, the state lawsuits led to a resolution that reflected the
interests of the state attorneys general. Though they are public
officials, their major concern was with the dollar amount reaped
by the states as part of the settlement, which is their principal
area of responsibility, rather than formulating broadly based
regulatory initiatives.
The competency of the judicial process also may be called
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into question. What is at issue in these suits is a very complex
judgment regarding the economic ramifications of a product
for an entire market. The question is not whether a manufac-
turer produced a defective product that harmed a particular in-
dividual. Rather, the state suits are being used to make an over-
all judgement regarding market outcomes and, ultimately, to
formulate a market-wide regulatory policy. The technical na-
ture of these judgments alone suggest, that they might be better
addressed by regulatory staffs with expertise in these matters.
Moreover, there also appears to be a mismatch between the lo-
cus of jury expertise and the scope of the problems being ad-
dressed in these cases.
By settling this litigation out of court rather than awaiting
the ultimate judicial disposition of these cases, the cigarette in-
dustry sacrificed the opportunity to provide a knowledgeable
baseline for ascertaining how future efforts such as this may
fare. The substantial litigation costs, legal uncertainties, and the
prospect of potential punitive damages may have motivated a
more cautious approach, as may the fact that the stock prices of
the cigarette industry firms repeatedly increased once different
settlement efforts were announced. The likely result is that
there will be a flurry of similar suits until there are definitive
judgments regarding the underlying rationale for this litigation.
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Table I
Summary of Smoking Risk Perception Results
Risk Question (Sample)
Lung Cancer:
Among 100 smokers, how many of them do you
think will get lung cancer because they smoke?
(U.S., 1985)
Among 100 smokers, how many of them do you
think will die from lung cancer because they
smoke? (N.C., 1991)
Among 100 smokers, how many of them do you
think will develop lung cancer because they
smoke? (U.S., 1997)
Out of every 100 smokers, how many of them do
you think will die from lung cancer because they
smoke? (M.A., 1998)
Total Mortality:
Among 100 smokers, how many of them do you
think will die from lung cancer, heart disease,
throat cancer, and all other illnesses because they
smoke? (N.C., 1991)
Risk Estimate
Full Samole Current Smokers
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Table 1 continued
Among 100 cigarette smokers, how many of
them do you think will die from lung cancer,
0.50 0.42
heart disease, throat cancer, or any illness
because they smoke? (U.S., 1997)
And out of every 100 cigarette smokers, how
many of them do you think will die from lung
0.54 0.46
cancer, heart disease, throat cancer, or any other
illness because they smoke? (M.A., 1998)
Risk Question (Sample)
Life Expectancy Loss:
The average life expectancy for a 21-year old
male (female) is the he (she) would live another
53 (59) years. What do you believe the life
expectancy is for the average male (female)
smoker? (N.C., 1991)
As you many know, an average 21 -year old male
(female) would be expected to live to the age of
73 (80). What do you think the life expectancy is
for the average male (female) smoker? (U.S.,
1997)
Risk Estimate
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Table 1 continued
As you may know, an average 21-year old male 10.1 8.6
(female) would be expected to live to the age of (males) (males)
73 (80). What do you think the life expectancy is
for the average male (female) smoker? (M.A., 15.9 13.2
1998) (females) (females)
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Table 2
Social Costs of Smoking in 1995
No Tar Adjustment Tar Adjusted Estimates
Total Medical Care 0.5804 0.4806
Sick Leave 0.0134 0.0119
Group Life Insurance 0.1439 0.1206
Nursing Home Care -0.2390 -0.2074
Retirement Pension -1.2589 -1.0553
Fires 0.0167 0.0167
Taxes on Earnings 0.4247 0.3438
Total Net Costs -0.3186 -0.2891
Note: All estimates update the 1993 cost estimates in W. Kip Viscusi, Cigarette Taxation and
the Social Consequences of Smoking, in 9 TAX POL'Y AND THE ECON. (James Poterba ed., 1995)
to 1995 data whenever possible, using a 3 percent interest rate.
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Table 3
Estimates of State Externalities Due to Smoking ($ per pack)* -
Excise Tax Medical Nursing Taxes on
Pensions Total'
Care Homes Earnings
Alabama .165 .019 -.038 -.063 .015 -.061
California .370 .028 -.097 -.111 .017 -.157
Florida .339 .026 -.075 -.052 .016 -.080
Mississippi .180 .017 -.025 -.043 .014 -.032
New York .560 .068 -.058 -.076 .027 -.034
U.S. Average .315 .029 -.072 -.063 .017 -.084
* All estimates use 1995 data converted to present value using a 3 percent rate of interest.
a Excluding excise taxes
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Table 4
Summary of Agreement Payments by Year
Initial Annual Additional
Total
Year Payments Payments Payments
($ in Billions)
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Table 5




Base Payments 0.250 0.220
Additional Payments 1.450 1.365
Agreement Payments
Executive Committee 0.004 0.001318
Enforcement 0.050 0.050
Initial Payments 12.742 12.0
Annual Payments 189.890 130.671
Additional Payments 8.610 5.798
Total Payments Over 25 Years 212.996 150.104
*Present value is based on use of 3 percent rate of interest.
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